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UK Rail Workers’ Perceptions of Accident Risk Factors: An Exploratory Study 
 
Abstract 
Although non-fatal injuries remain a frequent occurrence in Rail work, very few studies 
have attempted to identify the perceived factors contributing to accident risk using qualitative 
research methods. This paper presents the results from a thematic analysis of ten interviews with 
On Track Machine (OTM) operatives. The inductive methodological approach generated five 
themes, of which two are discussed here in detail, ‘Pressure and fatigue’, and ‘Decision making 
and errors’. It is concluded that for companies committed to proactive accident risk reduction, 
irrespective of current injury rates, the collection and analysis of worker narratives and broader 
psychological data across safety-critical job roles may prove beneficial. 
 
Keywords: Rail; accident risk; track maintenance; contributory factors; fatigue; time pressure; 
errors; mistakes; violations; safety II 
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UK Rail Workers’ Perceptions of Accident Risk Factors: An Exploratory Study 
 
1. Introduction 
The UK Network Rail workforce safety statistics for the five years preceding, and 
including 2013/2014, show that while fatal worker injury rates have remained consistently low 
with three deaths in both 2009/10 and 2013/14, major injuries have risen over this period, from 
96 to 122, and lost time injuries have risen from 146 in 2009/10 to 310 in 2013/14 (Network 
Rail, 2014). In addition to the pain and suffering caused, the financial cost of workplace injuries 
and illness is high for both individuals and for companies, estimated at £14.3 billion in 2013/14, 
of which workplace injuries (including deaths) cost £4.9 billion (HSE, 2015). Network Rail has 
identified three principal safety risks for rail workers; being hit by a train, on-track plant, or a 
road rail vehicle; electrocution from overhead power lines or conductor rails; and trips and falls. 
The seriousness of these risks alongside injury rates consistently above zero provides a clear 
rationale for further research to identify, examine and understand the factors that influence 
accident risk in railway work.  
Accident prediction is complex, largely due to the number of potential contributing 
factors. Since the early 1990’s safety-critical industries (including healthcare and aviation) have 
adopted a “systems” approach to safety management (Reason, 1995). This approach is important 
because it recognises that although frontline employees are prone to human error, this is 
promoted or permitted by system features such as environmental factors, operator condition, 
personnel factors, unsafe supervision, and wider organisational influences (Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 2003). In a number of high-risk domains, including healthcare, specific frameworks for 
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studying work systems have been proposed (e.g. System Engineering Initiative for Patient 
Safety, Carayon et al. 2006; Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework, Lawton et al., 2012b). 
Rail safety research and management has until recently lagged behind other safety-
critical industries in the development and use of domain-specific error and contributory factor 
identification methods and tools (Baysari, McIntosh, and Wilson, 2008). Instead, the focus has 
been on evaluating and enhancing rail safety culture and climate (e.g. Colley and Neal, 2012). 
While this general approach is important, and continues to be the most popular, a number of rail 
safety researchers have begun to adapt existing classification methods, used in other industries, 
in an attempt to systematically identify active and latent system failures in rail operation with a 
view to developing intervention strategies for minimizing error and reducing accident risk. The 
most common methodological approach utilised in these studies has been root cause analysis of 
archival accident investigation data (Baysari et al., 2008; Read, Lenné, and Moss, 2012; Reinach 
and Viale, 2006). A common factor identified as contributing to accidents and incidents across 
these studies is decreased alertness and physical fatigue in frontline rail workers, but other 
factors include poor equipment design and equipment failure, the physical environment, 
inadequate training, and high workload. In the most recent of these studies, Read et al. (2012) 
used the Contributing Factors Framework (CFF) to code ninety-six investigation reports into 
Australian rail incidents and accidents that had occurred over a retrospective ten-year period. 
Their results supported all three of their study hypotheses. Firstly, they found that task demand 
factors (such as high workload, distractions, and time pressure) were associated with skill-based 
errors (including memory and attention lapses). In contrast, they also revealed that accidents and 
incidents attributed to mistakes (knowledge- or rule-based errors) were significantly associated 
with knowledge and training deficiencies. Thirdly, they found that social environmental factors 
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such as social norms were associated with violations. While this study is one of very few to 
apply a contributory factors framework to rail accident data, it is notable that the findings were 
comparable with those of previous research exploring the relationships between errors and 
contributing factors in non-rail incidents and accidents (e.g. Hobbs and Kanki, 2008; Hobbs and 
Williamson, 2003).   
The utilisation of contributory factor frameworks in rail safety management represents a 
considerable move forward and has provided the rail industry with some general guidance with 
respect to the role of system features, such as the importance of equipment reliability as well as 
worker condition, knowledge, and training. However, there are a number of limitations 
associated with the methods and tools used. In particular, the subjective, reductionist, and 
reactive nature of the factor identification process can be questioned. For example, not all of the 
accident investigations analysed in these studies have followed the same methodologies, and the 
way in which the evidence has been interpreted is dependent on a particular investigator’s 
background and prior experience (Read et al., 2012). 
The factor coding process has also lacked objectivity and in some instances has led to 
considerable disparity between raters (Baysari et al., 2008). Also, the use of frameworks that 
classify the conditions that promote human error fail to completely encapsulate the complexity of 
the causal links between, and combinations of, contributory factors at different levels of the 
system (Read et al., 2012). The reliance on archival accident and incident data across numerous 
rail worker job roles is a further criticism of this approach. For safety-critical organisations to 
remain vigilant and error tolerant, they need to take a proactive approach to minimising future 
accident risk as well as reacting to past events (Reason, 2008).  
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A largely overlooked alternative means of examining contributory factors is to use 
interviews to explore worker perceptions of the causes of past adverse incidents or accidents, and 
to gather information about system conditions that are perceived to heighten current and future 
accident risk. The underutilisation of this qualitative approach is surprising given that the 
acknowledgement of, and use of frontline worker knowledge and experience is thought to be a 
central component in High-Reliability Organizations (HROs), and positive safety-cultures 
(Jeffcott, Pidgeon, Weyman, & Walls, 2006). In other high-risk domains such as healthcare, 
researchers have begun to recognise the effectiveness of interview techniques in gaining rich 
information regarding causes of patient safety breaches (e.g. Lawton, Curruthers, Gardner, 
Wright and McEachan, 2012a; Silen-Lipponen, Tossavainen, Turunen, & Smith, 2005). To our 
knowledge, however, there is only one published journal article, to date, that describes the use of 
interviews within the area of rail safety research (see Farrington-Darby, Pickup, and Wilson, 
2005).  
Using Schein’s (1990) organisational culture model to build a conceptual framework to 
guide the design of their interview schedule and analysis of their data, Farrington-Darby and 
colleagues (2005) identified forty underlying factors that influence safe behaviour and a safe 
culture for railway maintenance workers. In addition to cataloguing their findings, Farrington-
Darby and colleagues also provide a useful account of their interview process and the way in 
which the findings were presented to the commissioning rail engineering company, as well as the 
organisation’s subsequent response. A fundamental limitation of their work, however, is that the 
authors were only able to identify and list these factors rather than explore them in any depth. 
Nevertheless, while the authors do not describe them as such, it appears that their list may 
include system features that could be classified as contributory factors in unsafe track work. For 
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example, if one were to use the categorisation of system conditions described by Wiegmann and 
Shappell (2003) as a guiding framework, Farrington-Darby et al.’s list of forty factors include 
those that could be classified as environmental factors such as “physical conditions”, and 
“working hours”, as well as operator conditions, such as “individual perception of what safe is”, 
“knowledge and understanding”, and “fatigue, concentration, ability to function”. Their list also 
contains personnel factors like “inconsistent teams/subcontractors”, “communication on the job 
(excessive and poor quality)”, and “training methods”. Factors that, using a systems approach 
could be categorised under unsafe supervision were also listed, such as “setting up site safety on 
the day”, “supervisors technical competencies”, and “supervisors presence”. A number of factors 
could also be described as wider organisational influences. For example, “rule dissemination”, 
“equipment (condition, appropriateness and availability)”, “methods for reporting”, “feedback 
cycle”, “information/communication route clarity”, and “rule book usability and availability”.  
The Farrington-Darby et al. (2005) study has informed the work of rail safety 
practitioners and researchers (represented by over 75 citations, at the time of writing), however, 
its impact is somewhat limited by a number of theoretical and methodological flaws. First, the 
paper makes no distinction between the perceived influence of safety culture (defined as shared 
norms and values about safety), and the perceived influence of contributory factors, on the 
unsafe behaviour of rail maintenance engineers, even though these two constructs are usually 
separated (e.g. Colley and Neal, 2012; Read et al., 2012). This lack of clarity impairs the already 
restricted utility of the study findings (i.e. the listing rather than discussion of factors). Secondly, 
the use of a conceptual model derived from the literature on organisational culture to guide the 
design of the interview schedule and the coding of data by subject-matter experts affords a 
similar lack of objectivity evident in studies that have used rail-specific contributory frameworks 
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in the analysis of accident and incident data (Baysari et al., 2008; Read, et al., 2012; Reinach and 
Viale, 2006). 
2. Research aims 
The present paper documents an exploratory interview study conducted in collaboration 
with a rail engineering company with a good safety record and low accident rates. The principal 
aim was to proactively identify the factors contributing to accident risk in On Track Machine 
(OTM) operation as perceived by a specialist group of rail safety workers – On Track Machine 
Workers. Our study attempted to overcome some of the limitations of previous rail safety work 
by collecting prospective data about current and future accident risk (rather than retrospectively 
coding accident and incident data some time after an event occurrence). Our inductive 
methodological approach reflects the assumption that individuals are capable of both giving rich, 
detailed accounts of their experiences and of making sense of those experiences. Rather than 
relying on existing a priori explanatory frameworks and subject matter expert knowledge we 
adopted a grounded approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) to the data collection. We did this in 
order to remove (as far as it is possible to do so) any potential preconceptions, assumptions and 
expectations that might influence our subsequent analysis of the voiced experiences of our 
participants. 
It was particularly important that we took this approach as our sample comprised one 
specific, specialist group of safety-critical rail workers who were in a position to give voice to, 
and interpret, their safety-related experiences with regards to one highly specialised type of 
work: On Track Machine work. The role of Driver Maintainer Operator- OTM (On Track 
Machine) involves obtaining relevant materials for the job, carrying out the on-track work, 
reporting faults and accidents, recording the work that is carried out and signing off the relevant 
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paperwork. To do this, they wear high visibility clothing, ear defenders, safety helmet and safety 
goggles. The Driver Maintainer Operator- OTM drives the machine on the tracks and maintains 
and operates the regulators and tempers. The Machine Supervisor-OTM oversees the operational 
delivery and management of staff. Given the highly specialised and specific nature of this type of 
work, which takes place at night, in the dark, on the tracks and using machinery, and given that 
our concern is safety, it was essential that a truly inductive approach was taken to allow 
perceptions of safety issues to emerge without any potential distortion or occluding by prior 
expectations.   
Our aim was to establish those accident risk issues that were of immediate concern for 
On Track Machine workers in the first instance and consequently provide the impetus for 
potential system and process changes, and/or the necessity for further research.  
3. Method 
3.1 Participants and recruitment 
Information about the study was sent to employees by email, by letter and was also made 
available on the organisation’s intranet site. There were sixteen fully qualified OTM workers 
employed in the Plant division of the company at this time. Those workers workers who wished 
to take part in the study contacted their manager and these names were sent in turn to the OTM 
business manager who arranged times for participation. Time was also granted to consider 
participation and ask questions of the research team, after which ten participants consented to be 
interviewed   Arrangements were then made with the employer for the ten male On Track 
Machine (OTM) operatives to have one-to-one interviews timetabled into their future work 
plans.  
3.2 Interview schedule 
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A semi-structured interview schedule was developed and utilised, thus each participant 
was asked the same open-ended questions but not necessarily in the same order, and there was 
scope for participants to talk about relevant issues of concern to them. In keeping with our study 
aim, the interview schedule was designed to examine the factors that are perceived to heighten 
current and future accident risk in On Track Machine (OTM) operation. Participants were asked 
to describe their work, what their job entails on a day-to-day basis, to describe the training they 
had received in order for them to do their job (including health and safety training), to outline 
any health and safety risks associated with their work, and to outline their experience of 
circumstances in which this risk is heightened. They were also asked to describe the ways in 
which they manage these safety-critical risks. Participants were also asked to describe the role of 
their work supervisor and their co-workers in promoting safe working practices and to indicate if 
they had ever witnessed any unsafe work practices. In particular, participants were asked to 
consider a time when they felt most vulnerable in their work, when safety had perhaps been 
compromised, or could potentially have been compromised. Participants were questioned about 
what they do to keep themselves safe at work and how they cope with working in a safety critical 
environment.  
3.3 Procedure 
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the University Research Ethics 
Committee and processes for participant recruitment and protection, data collection and storage 
were in keeping with British Psychological Society Code of Ethics and Conduct (BPS, 2009). 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted by two independent qualitative researchers, who 
were provided with a detailed briefing about the study, its aims and approach. Interviews took 
place in a quiet room at one of the employer’s plant maintenance depots, each lasting between 
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one and two and a half hours in duration, during which participants were offered refreshments. 
Each interview was audio-recorded, transcribed verbatim and anonymised, to protect participant 
identity. In keeping with the interview schedule, each participant was first asked to describe their 
job and daily duties. This served as a warm up question and set the scene for later questions 
around safety, training and risk. At the end of the interview, participants were invited to ask any 
questions they had about the study and to add any further details that they had not had the 
opportunity to discuss during the course of the interview.  
4. Data analysis and discussion 
Two researchers experienced in qualitative research (RA and PF) analysed all 10 
transcripts using thematic analysis. This involved the careful reading and re-reading of each 
transcript line-by-line, initially identifying descriptive codes. Codes provide labels for aspects of 
the data which are potentially relevant to the research question. (Braun and Clark, 2006; Clarke 
and Braun, 2013). Based upon a process of comparative analysis, codes were grouped according 
to similarities and differences, resulting in themes which expressed patterns across the dataset.  
Both researchers initially analysed the same two transcripts, compared the codes and themes 
each had generated, resolving any differences through discussion, and then developed a thematic 
framework. This framework comprised a number of overarching themes and sub-themes, each of 
which was described according to its constituent codes, and was used to code the remaining eight 
transcripts, with each researcher coding four transcripts. 
Individually and through discussion, new codes were added to the framework to describe 
data not already accounted for, and existing themes expanded and developed to include the new 
information. In further discussions, the researchers refined the themes to ensure all aspects of the 
dataset were accounted for by the final framework. One example of this process is researchers' 
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decision to move from four to a final five themes. One of the initial four themes was titled 
'Responsibility and Risk', and included subthemes of 'Safety Culture,' 'Bending and Breaking 
Rules,' 'Making Mistakes and Having Accidents,' 'Reporting Concerns, Incidents and Near 
Misses' and 'Managing Fatigue and Pressure.' This theme was split to reflect the sense that some 
subthemes were related to the heightening of accident risk and others to reducing or managing it. 
Hence, 'Safety Culture' was separated to form its own theme and, in order to reflect the 
complexity within that theme, subthemes were identified, namely, 'Safety and the Employer,' 
'Safety Conscious Teams' and 'Individual Responsibility for Safety'.  
Five overarching themes were generated. These are presented as a thematic map in Figure 
1., and with respective definitions, constituent subthemes and illustrative data excerpts in 
Appendix 1. These themes were entitled ‘Pressure and Fatigue,’  ‘Decision making and Errors,’ 
‘Safety Culture,’ ‘Communication and Training,’ and ‘Wellbeing and Support.’ For the purposes 
of the present paper, the first two themes, ‘Pressure and fatigue’, and ‘Decision making and 
errors’ are discussed in detail. The rationale for this is three-fold. Firstly, these were the strongest 
two themes to emerge from the data and as such warrant detailed consideration. Secondly, it 
appears that these themes define the factors that contribute to heightened accident risk for OTM 
operatives. In contrast, rather than identifying contributing factors, the other three themes appear 
to describe the factors that have the potential to attenuate accident risk and are reported 
elsewhere (Morgan, Abbott, Furness, & Ramsay, 2016, in preparation). Thirdly, the practical 
consideration of paper length. To explore all themes in sufficient depth here would create a 
rather cumbersome task for the reader, thus potentially reducing the utility of the findings 
described. 
4.1 Superordinate theme one: Pressure and fatigue  
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Fatigue was referred to as extreme tiredness or weariness and associated difficulties in 
responding to the changing requirements of the job. Pressure was described as the burden of 
mental stress associated with demands, which were difficult to meet, especially within imposed 
time constraints. Fatigue and pressure were discussed by participants as a daily challenge of 
working life and were linked to the sub-themes of shift work and rostering, transition time 
(between home and work), work-life balance, and the perceived inefficiency of ‘downtime’ 
during working hours.  
4.1.1 Shiftwork and rostering 
Hedges and Sekscenski (1979) define shiftwork as a work pattern that requires at least 
half of the work to take place after 4pm and before 8am. More recently, the UK Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) have defined shiftwork as “a work activity scheduled outside standard 
daytime hours, where there may be a handover of duty from one individual or work group to 
another; a pattern of work where one employee replaces another on the same job within a 24-
hour period” (HSE, 2006, p.6). Frequent transitions between day and night shifts and the practice 
of working one night on, one night off, described by some workers, caused problems in getting 
enough sleep, resulting in tiredness and impacting on safety: "so you're laid in bed, thinking, go 
to sleep, go to sleep, go to sleep and it's hard... you're fit to do a job but not as fit as you should 
be, I don't think. I think it can compromise you." Shiftwork has long been recognised as exerting 
a negative impact upon employees’ performance (Åkerstedt, 2003; Shen et al, 2006; Kanterman, 
Juda, Vetter, & Roenneberg, 2010; Paterson, Dorrian, Clarkson, Darwent, & Ferguson, 2012) 
and at time of writing there is no legislation in the UK that pertains to shiftwork in particular. 
The source of the negative impact of shiftwork is manifold and includes such factors as reduced 
amounts of restorative sleep (Hossain, Reinish, Kayumov, Bhuiya, & Shapiro, 2003), difficulties 
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in falling asleep and somnolence at work (Åkerstedt, 2003). These findings are compounded by 
recent evidence that indicates that there is no difference in shiftwork tolerance between those 
new to shiftwork (in a sample of nurses) and those who have been doing it for six years 
(Saksvik-Lehouillier et al, 2013): age (being younger) rather than experience lends resilience, as 
does hardiness. 
In an exploration of one particular type of rail shiftwork for Network Rail, Cebola, 
Golightly, Wilson, & Lowe (2012) conducted a digital diary study of “distal” on call work in 
infrastructure maintenance managers, where employees are on call from their homes for 24 hours 
a day for seven days at a time before coming off shift. They found that anxiety and fatigue were 
worse during on call weeks when compared to off call weeks. Indeed, it has been demonstrated 
that the specific chronotype of shift (morning, day or evening) influences ratings of quality of 
life and sleep in Brazilian train drivers (de Araújo Fernandes et al, 2013). It has been shown that 
permitting breaks for sleep during nursing nightshifts can assist recovery from shifts (Silva-
Costa, Rotenberg, Griep, & Fischer, 2011) however it is insufficient on its own to guarantee 
recovery. In their coverage of fatigue management systems for rail workers, the Office of Rail 
Regulation (ORR; 2012) recognise the rise in risk of accidents towards the end of shift and 
beyond and recommend reducing workers’ involvement in safety critical work towards the end 
of their shift along with the provision of additional supervision, amongst other recommendations. 
Certain shift patterns caused stress and resentment among workers, and participants 
perceived that staff charged with shift scheduling duties, who did not themselves work shifts, had 
little appreciation of their effect: “They don’t seem to put any thought into your welfare. See, the 
roster clerk works Monday-Friday, 9-5. I don’t think she has any idea what it’s like to work the 
kind of shifts we do or she wouldn’t roster us like that”. Recently, Pisarski and Barbour (2014) 
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found that control over shifts worked impacted upon tiredness levels, with work life conflict 
being the strongest predictor of “concurrent fatigue” (p. 773) in a sample of nurses. In our own 
study, participants also described being asked, and often expected to, take on additional shifts on 
a regular basis ("if we don't ask not to be rostered an extra, we will"), which some perceived was 
due to understaffing, hence extending their working hours and compounding the problems.  
 
4.1.2 Transition time 
Workers were often required to travel to jobs at considerable distance from their home, 
resulting in lengthy journeys of several hours' duration to and from work. This caused most 
problems at the end of some shifts when workers were faced with a long drive when over-tired 
and with depleted levels of concentration. Participants spoke of feeling unsafe in these situations, 
as demonstrated in Appendix 1. They sometimes had an option of an overnight hotel stay, but 
often chose to go straight home to family instead. Some spoke of taking a sleep break on the 
journey, but others, keen to get to home and bed as quickly as possible, opted to keep driving 
despite the risks: "I don't want to be away. I'm sick of being away lots, so I just drive home." 
There is evidence that the likelihood of having a road accident in the early morning is 
related to the commute home after a night shift (Steele, Ma, Watson, Thomas, & Muelleman, 
1999; Ohayon, Lemoine, Arnaud-Briant, & Dreyfus, 2002; Stutts, Wilkins, Scott Osberg, 
&Vaughn, 2003). Additionally, in a study of medical interns in the US, the risk of a traffic 
accident was significantly increased when travelling home from work after an extended shift as 
compared to a shift of normal duration (Barger et al, 2005). Ftouni et al (2013) examined traffic-
related incidents in nurses commuting to and from their shifts and found that in both permanent 
and rotating nightshift nurses, sleepiness and driving events during their commutes were more 
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common after their night shifts than before them. “Shift workers were over eight times more 
likely to experience hazardous driving events [… ] during commutes home following an 8–10-h 
shift, compared with during their drive to work.” (Ftouni et al, 2013, p.64).  
4.1.3 Work-life balance 
According to participants, shift work, overtime and home-work travel negatively 
impacted on family life, through either reduced or poor quality time (when exhausted and 
irritable) with loved ones, as shown in Appendix 1. One interviewee commented: "I've got a nice 
house but I'm never in it." Some spoke of being rostered to work extra weekends above their 
contractual obligations, and being unable to make plans beyond the two weeks of rostered shifts: 
"Personal life? Nobody's got a life at [company name]." Participants described being obliged to 
check for shift changes via email and to make or receive telephone calls when at home, which 
meant they could never truly switch off: “There is times [on days off] when I come back the 
phone after 12 hours and I’ll have 8-9 missed calls, a lot of texts, a lot of emails (Interviewer: 
work related?), work related stuff.”  
The psychological contract – based on the beliefs about the nature and form of the 
exchange between employee and employer - plays a central role in the relationship between the 
two parties with breaches proving difficult to repair (Rousseau, 2011). This difficulty of repair 
might stem from breaches being demonstrated as being taken personally (Rodwell and Gulyas, 
2013). Fulfilment of the psychological contract is associated with positive work engagement, 
reduced intention to leave the job, and positive health outcomes (Parzefall and Hakanen, 2010). 
Breaches of the psychological contract are not necessarily individual events (Parzefall and 
Coyle-Shapiro, 2011) and might arguably lead to disengagement: it has been shown that 
disengagement (Christian and Ellis, 2014) can in turn lead to organisational deviance. This is in 
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turn more likely when an employee’s intention to leave the job is already high (Christian and 
Ellis, 2014). 
4.1.4 Downtime and time pressure 
This describes the time workers spent waiting for a job to be ready for them whilst on 
duty. In many cases, participants reported sitting around for hours into their shift, waiting to 
begin work on a repair or maintenance task, and "nine times out of ten, they are always running 
late." This is typically followed by intense pressure to complete the work in order to get the job 
done quickly for the company and/or to finish their shift on time and avoid working longer 
hours, getting home later, and feeling even more fatigued. As one participant observed, "it 
depends what sort of job it is: say if it's a renewal and you're sat for hours, you know you're 
going to be overrun, and you know you've got, someone's obviously got to do the job, otherwise 
they can't have their track back, so yeah, there is pressure in that response (Interviewer: To get 
every job done on time?) to get it done on time". 
While there is no research that has dealt with the problem of downtime in safety-critical 
work, a number of studies have found that people working in other industries also experience an 
underlying pressure to complete a job before the end of a work shift. For example, for the nurses 
in Lawton et al.’s (2012) study, this was due to an unspoken expectation that tasks would be 
completed within the shift so that the next shift could start with a clean slate, to give the 
impression they could manage their workload under pressure, leading inevitably to corners being 
cut in order to get the job done. 
Although the role of fatigue is acknowledged in previous rail research (Baysari et al., 
2008; Farrington-Darby et al., 2005; Read et al., 2012; Reinach and Viale, 2006), the interview 
data in our study revealed a specific combination of downtime followed by time pressure as a 
18 
RAIL WORKER ACCIDENT RISK FACTORS                                               
contributory factor in perceived heightened accident risk for OTM workers (see Appendix 1.). 
Cavanaugh, Boswell, Roehling, and Boudreau (2000) distinguish between “hindrance” job 
demands, and “challenge” job demands. In a later study of nurses (Bakker and Sanz-Vergel, 
2013) work pressure was perceived as a hindrance demand (as opposed to the emotional 
demands which were perceived as a change demand). 
Time pressure of the type experienced by the workers in our study can be conceptualised 
as a hindrance demand. Time pressure has been identified as one of several key psychosocial 
demands, along with workload and working long hours facing workers in the construction 
industry (Boschman, van der Molen, Sluiter, & Frings-Dresen, 2011; Sluiter, 2006) and which 
are associated with poorer health outcomes. It is considered a form of psychosocial workload and 
is linked to an increase in mental health problems (Zoer, Ruitenburg, Botje, Frings-Dresen, & 
Sluiter, 2011). Furthermore, workplace hindrance stressors are associated with a reduced 
likelihood of safety policy compliance and an increase in near-misses (Clarke, 2012). 
The relationship between type of workplace demand (hindrance or challenge) and 
behavioural outcomes is not a direct one, however, as it has been demonstrated that employee 
appraisal mediates the relationship (Webster et al, 2011). Participants spoke of their frustration at 
the waste and inefficient use of their work time, described as "madness", feeling tired when in 
“switched off mode”, but needing to stay alert whilst waiting, and the pressure to complete the 
work in a hurry once started. We acknowledge that due to the co-ordination of multi-agency 
activities in rail work, downtime for OTM operatives is unavoidable.  However, if not managed 
properly, this downtime can potentially exacerbate negative fatigue effects on accident risk, 
especially if followed by intense time pressure, to get the job finished. 
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4.2 Superordinate theme two: Decision making and errors 
Whilst the first superordinate theme identified and characterised the influence of two 
factors, pressure and fatigue upon worker performance, the second superordinate theme 
described the impact of these factors with specific reference to workers’ ability to make good 
decisions, act safely and avoid accidents at work. Decision making involves an individual 
weighing potential costs against potential gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Decision-
making referred to workers' ability to do this, i.e. to select between appropriate alternative 
potential courses of action when at work. Errors included lapses of attention, and unintentional 
and intentional procedural violations made by workers, typically through lack of knowledge, 
concentration, or care. For the most part, decision making problems and errors occurred in high-
pressure situations and when fatigued. Sub-themes reflected strategies the workers used to 
manage fatigue, the likelihood of making “mistakes”1, the tendency to bend or break rules, and 
decisions surrounding reporting of accidents, incidents, and close calls.  
4.2.1 Managing fatigue and pressure 
As indicated above, workers often experienced considerable fatigue at work for various 
reasons, and they were typically proactive in being aware of and taking responsibility for both 
their own and colleagues' tiredness and concentration levels: "If someone's tired it's - as long as 
it's not ridiculously tired before they come to shift, then they're not fit for duty really - but if 
they're getting tired… they maybe just want to carry on and carry on … you've got to be able to 
say, no, that's enough, we'll just go and have a cup of tea, take twenty minutes." The problem of 
fatigue was compounded by long periods of downtime, during which concentration and alertness 
would wane. Workers had little power over these factors, but most spoke of using various coping 
                                                 
1 “mistakes” is used here to refer to all types of error, including decision making problems (akin to a 
layperson’s definition) rather than the technical definitions proposed in the research literature. 
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strategies to keep control of the situation in order to remain alert so that an awaited job could be 
completed successfully, safely and within challenging time constraints. These include drinking 
caffeinated drinks, taking short naps, getting fresh air, keeping the mind occupied with puzzles, 
reading and chatting with colleagues: "You just have to like get a bit of fresh air pick yourself up 
and get on with it so but it’s not ideal but there’s nothing we can do about it ya know it’s part 
and parcel of the job". It seemed most were successful in staying awake during downtime, but 
found it difficult to manage the changes of pace during their shift, moving rapidly from 
downtime to demanding tasks. Gander et al (2012, p. 574) refer to fatigue as “the inability to 
function at the desired level due to incomplete recovery from the demands of prior work and 
other waking activities. Acute fatigue can occur when there is inadequate time to rest and recover 
from a work period. Cumulative (chronic) fatigue occurs when there is insufficient recovery 
from acute fatigue over time. Recovery from fatigue, i.e. restoration of function, (particularly of 
cognitive function), requires sufficient good quality sleep.” Our finding that fatigue is implicated 
in error making is in accordance with the wider finding that shift work-induced fatigue is 
implicated in an increased risk of accidents (Åkerstedt, 1988; Violanti et al, 2012). 
Gander et al (2012) comment that both employer and employee share the responsibility for 
fatigue risk management. From the perspective of the organisation, Lerman et al (2012) present 
the case for the centrality of effective Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMSs) to the 
challenge of occupational fatigue. Such systems might typically include information about 
workload distribution across employees, shift patterns, employee fatigue awareness training and 
give consideration to the design of the work context where possible. Dawson, Chapman, and 
Thomas (2012) put forward the concept of “fatigue proofing” as a way for organisations to 
identify fatigue-related factors before they lead to accidents. They note that fatigue-proofing may 
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often take place informally with workers merely declaring they are fatigued to colleagues or 
using hand signals and requesting call-backs from colleagues. They argue that this is an approach 
that is useful for those work domains where restricting the hours of work is operationally 
challenging and is strengthened by its ecological validity. More recently still, Dawson, Searle, 
and Paterson (2014) offer a set of specific criteria to assist organisations in evaluating fatigue 
detection technologies which identify behavioural signs of fatigue. 
Whilst Gander et al (2012) assert that the responsibility for managing fatigue lies not only 
with the employer but also with employees, it is important to recognise that errors caused by 
fatigue-inducing work factors have consequences for the employee that are not inconsiderable 
from both a practical and emotional perspective. In a consideration of such consequences, 
Mankaka, Waeber, and Gachoud (2014) used a qualitative approach to explore post-error coping 
in nurses in Switzerland and found that whilst fatigue, poor communication and work overload 
were perceived as leading to errors, discussing the error with others formed the primary coping 
mechanism. 
Regarding pressure more generally, Nevalainen, Kuikka, and Pitkäl (2014) found that 
experienced GPs were more tolerant of ambiguity and coped better with medical errors than their 
less experienced counterparts, suggesting that experience provides a form of resilience and May 
and Plews-Ogan (2012) in their study of the effect of different types of conversation after serious 
medical errors, found that honest conversations with colleagues and patients’ families were most 
helpful. Conversations that were “cruel, insensitive, self-serving, and dishonest” (p.449) were 
unhelpful as were conversations that minimised the significance of the error.  
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4.2.2 Making “mistakes” and having accidents  
Although their employer had a good safety record within the industry and low accident 
rates, participants spoke of living with the daily risk associated with safety-critical work, and 
specifically the impact of their errors on the risk of fatal or serious accidents, such as being hit by 
a train, getting trapped or having a limb amputated by machinery, slips and falls, and skeletal or 
muscular injuries through heavy lifting.  
Consistent with Read et al.’s (2012) findings concerning the role of human error in 
Australian rail accidents, the perception amongst our participants was that accidents and 
incidents occurred as an indirect result of inexperience and lack of safety awareness 
(inexperienced workers were considered less “safety savvy”). It was suggested that accidents 
could happen as a result of mistakes (defined in the research literature as errors of intention or 
knowledge- or rule-based errors, see Rasmussen, 1983) made by novice workers with gaps in 
knowledge and/or shortfalls in training. Evidence of errors of action commonly referred to as 
slips or lapses (see Reason, 1990) were evident in the data (e.g. failing to look for moving stock 
when getting out of the cab). Again, in line with Read et al. (2012), task demand factors, 
specifically fatigue and time pressure were often associated with these skill-based errors with 
participants highlighting the occurrence of errors of action (such as flicking the wrong switches, 
as described in Appendix 1.), even for diligent, experienced staff. For example, one participant 
who experienced a near miss put this down to lapses in concentration through fatigue and said, 
"if I were fully switched on, safety conscious all the time, I would have looked before I got off the 
machine." Another commented, “if you feel under pressure you’re trying to think of everything 
you need to be doing, who you need to contact, whatever, there’s lot more risk of forgetting 
something.” The combination of inexperience and pressure was considered particularly 
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problematic: "when I first went out on the machine… you just start rushing flabbergasted and 
you're all over the place, then it's like you might as well sit back and have ten minutes for the 
amount of time you have been rushing about."  
4.2.3 Bending and breaking rules 
Participants were very mindful of the rules and procedures in place to protect them and 
their fellow workers (as indicated in Theme 3, Appendix 1.) and described being largely very 
safety conscious as individuals and having an employer who espoused a strong safety culture. 
Crucially, rule violations can be either intentional or unintentional (Dahl, 2013). They can also 
be viewed as either behaviours that need to be eradicated or as inevitable responses to emergent 
local situations (Hale and Borys, 2013). Interviews suggested that workers took safety seriously, 
refused to take on unsafe tasks and followed the rules and procedures set out by the company. 
However, this did not always happen, and workers were mindful of the costs, in money and time, 
of following every rule, so sometimes took the decision to bend or violate procedures, or take 
short cuts. One participant described running a signal to clear the mainline when his machine 
failed, rather than stopping and costing the company money by having to be pulled off: "I was 
thinking, well, if I can save ten grand and delays because we've stopped on the mainline, I'll just 
go straight in, great. I won't do that again (laughs)." In addition, participants described cutting 
corners or breaking rules to reduce the time costs, and to get a job done quickly, especially after 
long periods of downtime and towards the end of a shift: “Because it’s the end of a shift, 90% of 
the time when it’s getting done [breaking rules/not following procedures], people are wanting to 
get home” (see also Appendix 1.). Participants also stated that rule breaking was often an 
accepted way of completing a task, or they'd picked up this method of working during their 
training: "I have in fact once I’ve done it I’ve broken the rules driving erm without really 
24 
RAIL WORKER ACCIDENT RISK FACTORS                                               
thinking about it but that was down to erm when a machine failed as I was driving it so I ran the 
signal I… cos you’re not meant to use the phone when you’re driving…but I’d done that cos a 
similar thing had happened when I was train driving a similar thing had happened and the guy 
who was teaching me to drive did exactly the same thing [Interviewer: ok] I was sort of learning 
by proxy rather than… doing it the proper way". These testimonies are equivalent to the findings 
of a number of studies that have used contributory factors frameworks applied to both non-rail 
accident data (e.g. Hobbs and Kanki, 2008; Hobbs and Williamson, 2003), and data from the rail 
industry. Specifically, Read et al. (2012) found that rail incidents and accidents attributed to 
violations of rules and procedures were significantly associated with social environmental 
factors, such as social norms. Similarly, Dahl (2013), in a qualitative study of Norwegian 
petroleum workers, identified three factors that influence workers’ awareness of rules: work 
characteristics, the safety management system and social interaction. This latter category 
comprised interaction both with leadership and with co-workers. This is in accordance with 
previous findings into the predictors of safety violations which include individual traits, the 
organisational safety climate and the demands of competing goals (Alper and Karsh, 2009). 
Recently, work has been undertaken in the development of new ways of promoting and 
encouraging safe behaviours on construction sites through the application of a “behaviour-based 
safety (BBS)” approach (Choudhry, 2014). This approach involves managers and construction 
workers engaging in partnership to set safety targets: when safety-promoting behaviours were 
observed, colleagues were praised. The BBS approach resulted in an improvement in safety-
promoting behaviours across all criteria measured. Other recent and encouraging developments 
come from Zhang and Wu (2014) who identified dispositional mindfulness as playing a key role 
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in safety compliance and safety participation behaviours in a sample of nuclear power plant 
control room workers. They suggest this finding might be used in selection and safety training 
programmes.  
4.2.4 Reporting 
Within the safety culture of the employer, it was expected that accidents and near misses 
would be reported so that action could be taken to lower the risk of future negative events. 
Participants described completing paperwork and reporting problems to the company, however 
they also spoke of times when they or others had decided not to report, personally or ‘as a 
favour’ to a colleague: "I hit a few cables or whatnot, it's never got reported, it's just got fixed, 
but that's between me and the tech that's on there, that's our relationship, you know: I'm not 
dropping you in shit and he's not dropped me in shit, kind of thing." One of the key elements of 
Reason’s safety culture framework is an organisation’s ‘reporting culture’, as to whether workers 
are prepared to report accidents and near misses. In the interviewee’s example, above, the 
incident was not reported as the negative outcome could be fixed immediately. This is analogous 
to the findings of Lawton et al. (2012a), who found that the nurses they interviewed were 
unwilling to report errors where no harm was caused. Our participants stated that sometimes 
worker teams would decide against reporting in order to avoid wasting precious time and effort, 
and in the desire to finish, get home and to bed on time: “I didn’t report it, I should have done. 
(Interviewer: Why didn’t you?) Because we were already late and I was already into that period 
where we were going over our shift, you know. You start reporting things like that and it takes 
even longer.” Decisions about what to report seemed to rest on individual judgement: "some 
people report every little thing going and some people never report anything at all." Failure to 
report naturally results in the inaccurate estimation of accident and incident risks in the 
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workplace, and these data suggested that under-reporting was relatively commonplace and was 
often linked to pressure and the desire to limit fatigue. 
5. Concluding Discussion 
The aim of this exploratory interview study was to proactively identify the perceived 
factors contributing to accident risk for On-Track Machine operatives. Our inductive 
methodological approach generated five themes, of which two have been described in detail, 
supported by evidence from both the transcripts and existing literature. The first of these themes, 
Pressure and Fatigue, demonstrated the pervasive nature of fatigue in the working lives of the 
participants, and the impact of shift working, transition time to and from work, interference with 
home life, and downtime upon the perceived pressures of the job. The second, Decision-Making 
and Errors focused upon participants’ behaviours and cognitions as they manage and respond to 
workplace pressures and fatigue. This demonstrated that, while they identify strategies to cope 
with the need to remain alert during downtime, workers’ decision-making and risk-management 
abilities are nevertheless challenged and impaired by tiredness and the demands of completing 
work when time pressured. This results in the increased likelihood of errors, corner-cutting, and 
accident, incident, and near-miss occurrence and under-reporting.  
Our inductive approach signals a move away from the reliance on archival accident data and the 
top-down post hoc classification of contributory factors using existing models and frameworks. 
Despite our novel approach a number of our findings corroborate the small number of previous 
studies to have investigated rail worker accident risk. For example, using the Contributing 
Factors Framework (CFF) to code ninety-six investigation reports into Australian rail incidents 
and accidents, Read et al. (2012) also found that task demand factors (including high workload, 
distractions, and time pressure) were associated with skill-based errors (including memory and 
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attention lapses). In addition, Read and colleagues found that social environmental factors such 
as social norms were most likely to be associated with procedural violations. Our data also 
revealed that workarounds can become generally accepted amongst workers and in some cases 
even passed on by supervisors during training. Using Schein’s (1990) organisational culture 
model to build a conceptual framework to guide the design of their interview schedule and 
analysis of their data, Farrington-Darby and colleagues (2005) identified forty underlying factors 
that influence safe behaviour and a safe culture for railway maintenance workers. Their list of 
forty factors included those that can be considered inversely related to our themes and sub-
themes, namely “physical conditions”, “working hours”, “individual perception of what safe is”, 
“knowledge and understanding”, and “fatigue, concentration, ability to function”.  
5.1 Implications 
After considering the existing research evidence and the OTM interview responses an 
overview of our findings and a number of recommendations were presented to the company. The 
organisation reacted quickly in order to reduce accident risk for their workers.  
Beyond the immediate implications for the company we suggest that the replication of our 
approach more widely, for other job roles may help organisations better understand how frontline 
safety-critical workers negotiate accident risk on a day-to-day basis, and the challenges they face 
in doing this. The proactive use of psychological research methods to collect bottom-up data 
from frontline workers is in line with Hollnagel’s (2013) Safety II paradigm which suggests that 
safety researchers and practitioners should adjust their focus to examine Work-As-Done rather 
than Work-As-Imagined. Hollnagel argues that the definition of safety should be changed from 
‘avoiding that something goes wrong’, the traditional Safety I perspective, to ‘ensuring that 
everything goes right’ (Safety II). “Safety-II is the system’s ability to succeed under varying 
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conditions, so that the number of intended and acceptable outcomes (in other words, everyday 
activities) is as high as possible. The basis for safety and safety management must therefore be 
an understanding of why things go right, which means an understanding of everyday activities” 
(Hollnagel, Leonhardt, Licu, & Shorrock, 2013, p.17). According to Safety-II, the everyday 
performance variability needed to respond to varying conditions is the reason why things go 
right. Humans are consequently seen as a resource necessary for system flexibility and resilience. 
This is in contrast to the assumptions (or myths; see Besnard & Hollnagel, 2014) that underpin 
Safety I which describe well-tested and well-behaved systems where human performance 
variability clearly is a liability and where the human inability to perform in an expected manner 
is a risk. The acceptance of these assumptions has stimulated the use of top-down, reactive 
approaches to safety, including root cause, incident and accident analyses, the criticisms of 
which we have described above. The use of our inductive approach in the present study, and 
more broadly the adoption of employee-focused data collection methods allows for alternative 
explanations of how complex socio-technical systems actually work, such as Safety II, and can 
explore the ways in which workers have the potential to be flexible and adaptive when systems 
may not have been perfectly thought out and designed, or when conditions are difficult or 
challenging. 
In line with Safety II we propose the following potential benefits associated with the 
analysis of frontline worker data in addition to traditional methods: more validity in risk 
assessments, additional leading safety indicators, identification of ‘blunt-end’ support needs for 
‘sharp-end’ adaptations or coping, promotion of learning (from top performers), enhanced 
recruitment and selection tools, training need identification and tailored training design, 
enhanced intervention / control requirements & effectiveness testing, greater system monitoring 
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capacity, improved two-way management-worker communication and shared commitment to 
safety (safety-culture).  
In summary, our study demonstrates the potential utility of qualitative research in the 
identification of accident risk antecedents for safety-critical workers. It also highlights the 
importance of company engagement in proactive initiatives designed to further reduce accident 
risk and enhance safety-culture, irrespective of recent accident frequency.   
5.2 Potential Limitations and Future Research 
Our qualitative interview methodology was not novel. However, this was the first study to 
apply such an approach in this specific domain (Rail work and OTM operations), and to utilise 
qualitative research methods to identify the perceived factors contributing to accident risk for 
frontline rail workers. A further distinct feature of our design was the use of an inductive 
approach, although we recognise that our interview protocol may have biased workers towards 
predefined responses. We suggest that this was not the case in that the interview schedule was 
semi-structured to allow for open-ended answers and that interviewers were non-subject matter 
experts not involved in interview design. In addition, we included an open question at the end of 
the schedule to allow workers the opportunity to provide additional narrative about risk, not 
covered in the previous questions. 
The scope of our study could be considered limited in that we were primarily interested in 
the perceptions and experiences of a very specific group of workers rather than exploring the 
attitudes of employees from the wider work system, including managers and support staff. Also, 
we have perhaps not taken account of all of the system factors, which can contribute to accident 
risk for these workers. Indeed a whole system approach may have been useful, as would 
extending the participant pool to include other staff in the company and in similar companies. 
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However, we posit that by adopting a top-down approach, previous studies have assumed that 
managerial and contributory factor frameworks can accurately define the system factors that 
influence accident risk for frontline workers. Unfortunately this approach bypasses the frontline 
workers themselves. While our bottom-up approach cannot encapsulate all system risks it can 
illuminate those most salient for those working closest to the risk, the workers, which in our view 
is a valid and interesting alternative starting point.  
In accordance with most applied studies our design was somewhat restricted by operational 
logistics. While it may have been useful to widen the focus beyond our study population, our 
access was limited to OTM operatives for this project. Project logistics and scope also restricted 
the capacity to evaluate the usefulness of our findings for the company over the longer-term in 
relation to organisational safety indicators such as accident frequency. It is recommended that, if 
resources allow, future research should widen the focus beyond OTM rail workers, be 
longitudinal, and assess the utility of findings for worker safety. 
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Appendix 1. Interview themes. 
Theme (and definition) Sub-theme Example Excerpts 
Theme 1. Pressure and 
Fatigue 
Fatigue experienced as a 
continual and challenging 
aspect of working lives, due 
to job-related aspects: the 
rostering system, shift work 
(changing between night 
and day shifts) and 
'downtime' on the job (often 
followed by time pressure to 
finish the job before the end 
of the shift).  
Rostering and shift work “On top of all that [work 
pressure] you got the added 
issues of fatigue because the 
hours are vey anti-social. The 
rostering could be a lot better 
when it comes to between day 
and night.” 
Transition time “I think the unknown danger is 
when it's out of your control 
you know you're tired and you 
know what it's like you're 
driving down the motorway and 
you're tired and if you are on 
your own you put your music 
on, you open your window, you 
stop, they tell you to stop if you 
are tired and that, but you just 
want to get home and you think 
'it's only another 10 miles', but 
it's the last 10 miles which is 
most dangerous isn't it, because 
you could go, you know, 
because your eyes nod, you 
know.” 
Work / life balance “But again there's a lot of stuff 
bouncing through all the time 
as well ‘cos there's emails 
coming through all the time like 
shift changes you never really 
100% switch off to it.” 
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Downtime and time 
pressure 
“Times like when we've got 
downtime on a night shift, when 
you're starting late into the 
shift and you're in the kind of 
switched off mode and you're 
trying to…  (Interviewer: it's 
hard to get yourself back into 
that work mode?) Yeah, yeah 
you can miss things, and you 
can, it can be more dangerous, 
and when they're trying to rush 
you about at the end of a shift 
that's horrible. I don't like 
that.” 
Theme 2. Decision Making 
and Errors 
Workers altered their 
decision making processes 
in response to fatigue, 
downtime and time 
pressures (e.g. bending rules 
under time pressures or 
when fatigued; and 
evidence of fatigue/demand 
-induced errors of 
judgement). 
Managing fatigue and 
pressure 
“(Interviewer: So what sort of 
things do you make yourself do 
to try and stay alert in that 
time?) You just have to sit and 
chat to each other and keep 
drinking plenty of brews.” 
Making “mistakes” and 
having accidents 
“It was a simple mistake.  All 
I've done, I've knocked the two 
wrong switches. There's four 
switches, and I knocked the two 
middle ones out whereas I 
should have knocked the two 
outside (Interviewer: And you 
felt you'd done that...?) I was 
rushing and too tired.” 
Bending / breaking rules “(laughs) rules have to be 
broken on a day to day basis if 
you want to get anything done, 
just not realistic some of them.” 
Reporting concerns, 
incidents and near misses 
“(Interviewer: so what actually 
stopped you reporting that 
incident?) Didn't need to be 
reported cos it got fixed so 
nobody need to know it didn't 
matter. If you couldn't fix it I 
would actually have to report.” 
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Theme 3. Safety Culture 
An examination of safety 
culture, in terms of worker 
perceptions of shared values 
and norms about safety 
(driven by the rule book and 
rule following behaviour) 
and their perceptions of the 
factors influencing accident 
risk. A sense of 
responsibility was 
emphasised, not only in 
terms of their own safety, 
but also for others in the 
team and a sense of 
responsibility to the 
company. 
Safety and the employer “...because within a work site 
there’s supposed to be a work 
by the rule book ere r which 
applies to every company 
everybody who works on the 
railway everybody has to work 
to the same rule book 
(Interviewer: ok) and that’s 
what you’re supposed to be 
working to because with [name 
of company] I feel like I’ve 
been given adequate training 
on the rules and we’re more 
aware if what should be 
happening and how it should be 
happening than most of the 
people that we work for.” 
Safety conscious teams “I suppose I look at it slightly 
different now I'm in charge of 
the machine so I have to feel 
responsible for the safety of the 
men on my machine 
(Interviewer: of course.) I'm 
looking out more now than I 
possibly were before instead of 
just looking out for myself I'm 
looking out for others as well.” 
Individual responsibility 
for safety 
“Nobody wants to get injured, 
you know what I mean, so if 
you see something that’s not 
safe you don’t just think, ooh 
that looks dodgy, you know, 
you try to do something about 
it.” 
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Theme 4. Communication 
and Training 
Some methods of safety 
communication and training 
are perceived to have 
worked well (e.g. practical 
based safety training and 
verbal briefings), whilst 
others (e.g. awareness 
training and safety 
initiatives) are perceived as 
less effective in reducing 
accident risk for workers. 
Practical based training “I think the main thing that stuck 
with me were the speed of the 
trains. How fast they approach 
y’know. If you’ve got a train 
125mph and you think, you’re 
looking up a track before 
you’re going to cross the track 
you have a quick look and you 
can see perhaps a half a mile 
and then you look away and 
then you start walking, it can 
be there.” 
Monthly safety brief “Yeah, yeah, I know it’s easier 
for whoever is sending them out 
to just send one pack to 
everybody but if people are like 
OTM specific, just send out to 
them a couple of pages, then 
people would read it.” 
Verbal briefings “I mean, every time a machine 
comes in, everyone gets a 
briefing on safety.” 
'Hard line' rules vs. 'soft, 
transient' initiatives 
“I have read them and I have 
read what the [name of 
initiative] stands for but I just 
can't remember so it's 
obviously not had that much 
effect on me.” 
Positive perceptions of 
training on offer 
“We get adequate training.” 
“As I say, the company’s very 
good at these sorts of things to 
be honest.” 
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Improvements required in 
training and development 
“The lads underneath me aren’t 
trained to do it at all [aspects 
of machine operation], because 
if they train ‘em to do this extra 
stuff, they’ve got to pay ‘em for 
doing it.” 
“Me using stuff I’m not trained 
to use… I haven’t been trained 
on it, I still use it, that can be a 
near miss.” 
Theme 5. Well-being and 
Support  
Exhaustion, frustration and 
stress were some of the 
outcomes of workplace 
pressures on a worker’s 
physical and emotional 
well-being. Family support 
helped to buffer this, 
helping workers to cope. 
Physical and emotional 
well-being 
“Imagine, you’re up all Saturday 
night, you get home say eight 
o’clock Sunday morning, 
you’ve then got, you can’ stay 
awake all day or you’re 
grumpy, cos you’ve got a home 
life as well. You’re grumpy, 
you’re hard work, so you’re 
trying to go to bed for a couple 
of hours, but if you have too 
much sleep, you can’t sleep 
Sunday night and you’re 
working Monday morning, so 
that just puts stress on you 
straightaway.” 
“I ended up losing six pounds in 
one week in weight because I 
just couldn’t eat, I was that 
tired.” 
“I don’t really get stressed to be 
honest.” 
Coping with work “There’s times you get home, 
you’ve just been on the road for 
two and a half hours, and you 
just don’t want to do anything, 
you know, you’re just glad to 
sink into your flipping chair.” 
“How do I deal with it? Have a 
rant and a rave and a moan, 
and get on with it, the majority 
of the time.” 
"I smoke more when I'm tired." 
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Organisational support “Well I mean the support 
structure’s there; there’s no 
problem.” 
“It bucks you up a bit I suppose 
when you get this letter saying, 
well done.” 
“You are just expected to stop, 
do the work, and basically 
nobody cares.” 
Family support “I’m sure my missus gets mad 
with me talking about it all the 
time.” 
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Figure 1. Thematic map 
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